Countering Terrorism

Section: Psychology Essays

This stock can produce about 80,000 nuclear weapons. The real current danger in terms of the nuclear threat of terrorist suitcase bombs is the availability of weapons grade plutonium to terrorists. It is estimated that a few kilograms of this material could be purchased on the black market for several million dollars. There are rumors that attempts to make these purchases have already occurred. The availability of plutonium for sale to terrorist organizations also depends on the stability of a country's economy. It is thought that a destabilized economy increases the likelihood of a transaction with terrorists. To directly deal with this threat, Congress has initiated and maintained various program since 1991 to assist Russia in providing adequate security to nuclear materials, assist in dismantling weapons that were not necessary for its defense, assisting in converting reactors from plutonium production to power generation, and providing funding to research facilities so that nuclear scientists and technicians would not emigrate to other countries and provide assistance in nuclear weapons technology. These provisions are known as Nunn-Lugar after the senators who sponsored the initial bill. They are also known as Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programs. What Can Be Done at This Time While researching this issue, I frequently came across expert opinion that: It is not a question of if, but when terrorists will attack using some of these weapons. In spite of this level of concern by the experts there are no visible initiatives at the state and community level. In my opinion those initiatives should include education and organization around prevention and response to terrorist attacks. There should also be more information available on the importance of nuclear non-proliferation and assisting Russia with improving the security of its nuclear stockpiles and expert personnel. I would work on the following anti-terrorism agenda if elected: 1. Rigorous support for Nunn-Lugar or CTR programs: Preventing terrorist organizations from getting nuclear material that could be incorporated into a small device and imported into the United States is a priority. The best chance we have to do this is to assist Russian in dismantling their offensive nuclear weapons and supporting research by their current nuclear scientists into other areas.

These programs have many documented successes, and the potential cost is too high if we become less vigilant in this area. There are signs that we are becoming less willing to fund some of these measures. For example, the installation of radiation detectors at all of Russia's border locations would cost several billion dollars. Instead we have pledged a few million dollars, or enough to put detectors at a few key locations. We clearly need more resolve in this area. Another possible advantage of these programs may be new ideas on how to reduce and contain chemical and biological weapons. 2. Halting Production of Enriched Uranium and Plutonium: Both of these elements can be used to build nuclear weapons. The best way to assure more safety for the United States and the rest of the planet is to press for the cessation of the production of enriched Uranium and Plutonium. 3. Support for Recommendations by the Working Group on Civilian Biodefense: In the initial papers written by this group they emphasize the need for increased medical awareness and knowledge of these organisms and toxins. They also prioritize more rapid diagnostic techniques, and better knowledge about therapy, infection control, and decontamination strategies. Where it is needed they also recommend improved vaccines and increased stockpiles and production capacities of the specific vaccine. In the case of certain bacteria, antibiotic resistance has been demonstrated in the same organisms used for weapons. The Working Group recommends further study of this resistance phenomenon. 4. Local Experts and Treatment Protocols: The knowledge of what to do in a terrorist attack that potentially involves weapons of mass destruction currently exists in a few specialized facilities in the country. This expertise needs to be disseminated to local multidisciplinary teams and members of the medical community. These groups need access to the latest specialized information and potential hazards. If elected, I will work very hard in this area to make sure Minnesota has the local experts and they in turn have access to the information they need to respond to terrorist threats and actions. 5. Support for Current Counter Terrorism Efforts: The FBI is currently the lead agency for these efforts. They have been successful in intercepting terrorists in this country and tracking down terrorists who have completed an act of violence. An active dialogue between this agency and Congress is needed to make sure that this agency has the resources and cooperation it needs to be effective in this area. 6. Preventive measures to Reduce the Risk of a Successful Attack: The current public literature and commentary describes a high risk of attack in the next 25 years. So far there has been very little discussion of what citizens can do to prevent attacks and protect their families and communities. This discussion has to occur. I do not believe we can focus only on how to manage the consequences of an attack after it has occurred. This is an opportunity for involvement by all citizens. If elected, I will push for these strategies and encourage their dissemination to all citizens. All of these measures are important priorities because of the risks inherent in not paying attention to these threats.

Bibliography:

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